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In the former socialist redistributive economies, the transition to market economy and the 
conversion to private ownership followed different trajectories. The paper offers an 
overview on how a new class of grand bourgeoisie was formed in three different regions of 
the transition: Central Europe, Russia and China. In Central Europe this new class often was 
recruited from the ranks of the socialist technocratic elite who used their managerial skills, 
inside knowledge and political connections to convert public property into private wealth. 
The large propertied class of Central Europe is well formed, and private property rights are 
secure. In Russia, the new grand bourgeoisie was typically ‘appointed’ by the top political 
boss, and as leadership changed, the members of this class had to assure the new leader of 
their loyalty. Failure to do so meant loss of property, exile or jailed. In China, the transition 
to market economy occurred ‘from below’. Many of the wealthy started out with small 
private businesses that expanded over time. Once they became known to be wealthy, they 
needed political protection and were vulnerably to political rivalry. Private property in 
China—much like in Russia—is still rather insecure, and politics are in command.   
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1  Three pathways out of socialism 
In my earlier work I have struggled with the question of the different trajectories taken 
by the former socialist societies in shifting from socialism to capitalism. I focused 
mainly on the processes which took place amid the social hierarchy, what happened to 
the former elites and where did the new propertied bourgeoisie come from. From this 
angle I identified three different pathways out of communism, hypothesizing that 
Central Europe, Russia and China each constituted a different variety of post-
communist capitalism and subsequently followed different pathways (Eyal, Szelényi 
and Towsley 1998; Hanley 2000; King 2001, 2002; Stark 1990, 2001; Stark and Bruszt 
1998; King and Szelenyi 2005; Sachs and Woo 1994; Verdery 1996, 2003). Data for the 
original study were collected during the early stages of transition (1993). Thus it is 
timely to revisit the problem, and ask whether the divergence observed in the early 
stages of transition among the post-communist regions still exists and to review where 
the formation of a propertied bourgeoisie, in particular, the ‘domestic grand 
bourgeoisie’ is standing.  
In 1993 I termed Russia’s exit from socialism as capitalists without capitalism, a system 
that gave birth to a class of oligarchs (see also Gustafson 1999: 10-57; 108-33). 
Oligarchs used their close interaction with political power to transfer the ownership of 
former state firms to private property during the process of voucher privatization (King 
2002; Hanley, Yershova and Anderson 1995; Klebnikov 2000; Varese 2001; Stoica 
2004; Silverman and Yanovich 2000). Consequently, domestic private ownership 
became well developed, even though the institutions of the market were much less 
advanced (Woodruff 1999; Burawoy 1996, 2001; Fligstein 1996; Gerber and Hout 
1998; Gustafson 1999).  
In contrast I found little evidence in Central Europe for the conversion hypothesis. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was the leading force for privatization, former political 
elites typically were mobile downward and former management appeared to prefer 
cushy managerial positions in firms privatized by multinationals rather than the risky 
venture of becoming private proprietors. As far as the domestic class structure was 
concerned, this was managerialism and I labelled the system capitalism without 
capitalists, since market institutions were reasonably well developed by 1993, but there 
was little sign of the emergence of a domestic grand bourgeoisie. I also assumed that 
China followed a different trajectory, one that was incidentally closer to the classical 
model of transition to capitalism: it was capitalism from below (Naughton 1994; 
Goodman 2008; Zhou 1996; Nee 1989; Nee and Opper (2010), or in Huang’s (2008) 
terminology,  entrepreneurial capitalism. To the extent that a capitalist class was 
developing in China during the 1980s, it was likely to have emerged from among the 
small entrepreneurs gradually gaining prominence. 
Before turning to the question of how the new grand bourgeoisie was actually formed 
and the extent of this class, I offer a few comments on the three trajectories. Over the 
past 16 years there have been powerful converging forces operating in the post-
communist world. Hence while it was obvious in 1993 that post-communist countries, 
after extensive convergence under socialism, were adopting the old pre-socialist 
pathways and thus diverging from one other, some of these unique features began to 
disappear by the first decade of the twenty-first century.  2 
Central Europe currently does not fit the term capitalism without capitalists. Although 
still strongly dominated by foreign capital, a new propertied bourgeoisie was in the 
making, and even though joining the dollar-billionaire club was hard, some did make it. 
And the term capitalists without capitalism no longer applies to Russia. The duration of 
many of Russia’s nouveau riche was short-lived; a number of the oligarchs of Yeltsin’s 
era are in jail or in exile, and market institutions now work more effectively than they 
did during the early years of transition. Nor can China any longer be described as 
capitalism from below. China started privatization of the public sector in 1997 and the 
earlier, more spontaneous, bottom-up decentralized version of capitalism was replaced 
with a top-down, state-led growth strategy, in which the role of politics increased rather 
than declined (Walder 2002; Tsai 2007; Yusuf, Nabeshima and Perkins 2006; Huang 
2008).  
Nevertheless despite these convergences, there are still three distinctly different worlds 
of post-communist capitalism. Central Europe remains on a neoliberal trajectory, 
despite the emergence of a domestic bourgeoisie. The economies of this region are still 
heavily dependent on FDI and exports, and politically they are multi-party liberal 
democracies. With the rise of Putin, Russia has moved away from the kind of capitalism 
that emerged under Yeltsin. Putin brought the oligarchs under control by reminding 
them that their loyalty was to their state patron and thus greatly increased the capacities 
of the central state (Hoffman 2002: 470-89). Russia is a managed democracy, and given 
the prominence of Putin’s personality in running the country, it could characterized as 
personal authoritarian neopatrimonialism. Many (or most?) of the Russian rich became 
wealthy by ‘appointment’, receiving their wealth as ‘patrimony’ (Gustafson 1999: 35-
57) from Yeltsin and his entourage. If the new ‘tsar’ (Putin) doubted their loyalty this 
patrimony was taken away. With privatization under the watchful eye of an increasingly 
powerful central state, China was beginning to resemble Russia, although political 
power was less dependent on one individual. The Chinese state and government operate 
increasingly in a corporatist manner (Oi 1999; Lin 1995) incorporating various interests 
(including the new bourgeoisie) in the party. It can be labelled as one party corporatist 
hybrid economy (Nee and Su 1996; Nee and Cao 1999). Many of the wealthy in China 
are self-made men who started from the bottom but once at the top, they need the 
protection of the political bosses, who co-opt them into the existing communist party-
state structure.  
2  The new grand bourgeoisies: relationship between economic wealth 
and political power  
The study in 1993 was snapshot, taken arguably too early, just two years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Now 16 years later—years that proved to be rather 
turbulent in all three regions—it is time to revisit the problem, although similar survey 
data as in 1993 study are not available. 
I am currently working on a project with Tamás Kolosi,1 to analyse the various ways 
used by the wealthy to become members of the grand bourgeoisie. We have collected 
data on 210 Hungarians named over the past decade on lists identifying the country’s 
                                                 
1  Tamás Kolosi is a sociologist who after 1989 entered business while continuing to be active in 
scholarship. Today he is one of the wealthiest Hungarian private entrepreneurs. 3 
top-100 or top-150 richest individuals. The outcome of our project is a book tentatively 
titled  How to become a billionaire? In this paper, however, I focus on the top-ten 
Central Europeans (only two of whom are on list of the Hungarian rich) and compare 
these with the top-ten businessmen in Russia and China to explore whether the 
differences hypothesized above are still evident. So, the purpose of this paper is to 
explore how different or similar the process of upper-class formation was in the three 
regions of post-communist capitalism, under neoliberalism, authoritarian neo-
patrimonialism and corporatist neopatrimonialism. 
The so-called theory of political capitalism2 is a good point of departure for 
understanding the pathways selected by the new domestic bourgeoisie in the various 
post-communist regimes. Staniszkis (1991a, 1991b) and Hankiss (1990) formulated as 
early as 1988 a powerful theory that the source of the formation of the new bourgeois 
class was political capitalism. In Poland and Hungary, the communist elite began to 
recognize that disintegration of the socialist system was inevitable and made an attempt 
to take advantage of it. As the process (later labelled spontaneous privatization) started, 
high-ranking party and state officials tried to position their children (and occasionally 
themselves) in the emergent new capitalist economy to capture command positions 
(Rona-Tas 1994; Hanley, Yershova and Anderson 1995; Hanley 2000). Staniszkis’s and 
Hankiss’s accomplishment was quite extraordinary: they recognized the development of 
political capitalism at a very early stage (i.e., the use of a political office by 
officeholders to enrich themselves or at least their families) and their recognition of the 
fact might have played a role in preventing this process from coming to full fruit. In 
1988-89, having successfully converted their political capital into economic benefits, 
former top-ranking communist cadres were becoming the wealthy of a new class of 
grand bourgeoisie.  
Now twenty years later, we can revisit the political capitalism theory to examine the 
mechanisms that facilitated entry into the new class of the grand bourgeoisie. Already in 
a study in 1993 (Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989) we noted that the 
theory of political capitalism was arguably a self-defeating prophecy: thanks to 
Staniszkis and Hankiss, public opinion sufficiently early was aware of the dangers of 
consolidating the advantages of communist political office into capitalist enrichment, 
and very few (if any) political officeholders managed to join the ranks of the grand 
bourgeoisie (Eyal, Szelényi and Towsley 1998). 
This is not to say that political capital was unimportant,3 but it worked in ways different 
from what was expected at that time, and it worked through dissimilar channels in the 
various post-communist regimes. Based on the insights gained from the 1993 survey 
and later work, the following factors seem to have facilitated the formation of the new 
grand bourgeoisie.4 
                                                 
2   See for Ganev (2009) for an excellent review of Max Weber’s concept of political capitalism. 
3   As Ganev (2009) points out, political connections are important for all kind of capitalism.  
4   In what follows I rely strongly on my interviews conducted with Tamás Kolosi in November 2008 in 
the preparation of our book. 4 
2.1  Formation of the bourgeoisie class 
Political capital 
Political capital is significant, but its impact arguably had varying effects in different 
regions of the post-communist world:  
–  Individuals, who under communism had been in high political office, were more 
likely to be similarly placed in the post-communism period, and were thus able to 
promote the enrichment of their clients (they might or might not have received 
personal compensation for this from the oligarchs) through management buyouts 
(MBO) or voucher privatization; 
–  Political capital was transformed into social or networking capital. After 
transition, individuals in non-top political positions (for instance, with the 
Communist Youth League) took advantage of the social networks they had 
nurtured earlier in achieving business success during communist rule (Walder, Li 
and Treiman 2000); 
–  Often, the link to post- and anti-communist new political elites was an important 
channel to benefit from privatization, either through (MBO) or vouchers. 
Technocratic expertise gained under socialism  
While highly-placed political officeholders within the old regime rarely evolved into the 
grand bourgeoisie, many middle-to-high ranking managers and technocrats became very 
wealthy.5 They either privatized the firms they were already running (not necessarily as 
CEOs, but as members of the managerial team) through MBOs, by purchasing other 
firms or creating new ones. An essential factor was their expertise and knowledge of the 
investment markets and/or their connections to financial institutions, or even the 
political bosses of those institutions (a necessity in order to be able to obtain loans for 
voucher privatization). 
Second economy during socialism  
Some of the new grand bourgeoisie members had started out from very small shops that 
gradually expanded after market transition into large firms. This background was 
beneficial for learning how the market operated. These small ‘socialist entrepreneurs’ 
occasionally also accumulated some capital, which they used to their advantage once 
privatization opened up new opportunities.  
There is also a ‘selection problem’ here. It is assumed that becoming a successful 
entrepreneur implies, in all likelihood, that the individual is ‘entrepreneurial’, having the 
talent and aptitude for business. Hence, those destined for success later might have 
already been in business before private business became dominant. 
Foreign experiences 
Some of the nouveau riche are people who had lived abroad in the west for a number of 
years. They could have been stationed abroad in various businesses, had become 
familiar with the ways of the market and had established contacts, enabling them to 
                                                 
5   Szalai (1989) pointed out as early as 1989 that the big winners of transition were likely to be the 
technocrats; see Andreas (2009) for details on China. 5 
pounce on domestic business opportunities after the fall of communism. Others 
accumulated some capital abroad (in jobs which may not even have been business 
related) and were well positioned for a commercial take-off after 1989. Thus having 
experience of a capitalist country offered the appropriate attitude, networks and initial 
capital to the potential nouveau riche. 
New businesses 
Some members of the new grand bourgeoisie are young, started their careers after the 
fall of communism, and will simply follow the same pathway to the bourgeoisie class as 
those in the developed capitalist economies. Some of these are the business magnates of 
the post-communism era, similar to Steven Jobs. They start with little capital, build on 
innovative ideas, take risks—or then they may just be lucky (or, then again, success 
may be a combination of all these factors). 
3  The upper classes in Central Europe, Russia and China 
Next, let us take a look at the individuals in Central Europe, Russia and China ranked by 
various sources as being among the top-ten with respect to wealth in order to examine 
how important the various pathways to grand bourgeoisie might have been. 
First, a word of caution with regard to the ‘data’ presented, as the top lists utilized here 
are unreliable. Some of the very wealthy may well be in ‘hiding’, while the fortunes of 
others may be grossly overestimated. Hiding may be especially relevant in China where 
political suspicion of private ownership still exists. For instance, when in 2008 the 
Hurun Rich List identified Shuanghua Du, the chairman of Rizhao Steel, as the second 
wealthiest man in China, the party secretary of Rizhao Steel became very concerned, 
sending a representative to Hurun to persuade them to drop Du from the top-ten list, but 
without success.6 Yet, the concerns of the party secretary were not unfounded: the 
individual ranked as number one by Hurun in 2008, namely Guangyu Huang the 
chairman of the GOME group,7 has disappeared, is probably arrested and under 
investigation. In 2009, Rizhao Steel was nationalized; to the best of my knowledge, Du 
is free and in good health. But several others who had appeared on these top lists have 
been prosecuted and jailed. On top of this, given the lack of clear differentiation 
between public and private ownership, the wealth of the ‘princelings’ (the children of 
high cadres who run the state-owned enterprises, SOEs) is likely to be underestimated. 
They may actually own significant assets, classified as publicly-owned, but which are in 
fact private property.8  
It is unclear as to whether it is wise to be known in Russia as particularly wealthy. 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, a number of oligarchs believed to be 
among the wealthiest Russians ended up jailed (Mikhail Khodorovsky) or in emigration 
(Boris Berezovsky). The clash between the elite of the newly rich and political authority 
                                                 
6   China Business Focus, available at: www.gotoread.com. 
7   The GOME group is the largest consumer electronics firm in China (with an assumed wealth in 2008 
exceeding US$6 billion).  
8   I am grateful to Peng Lu who brought this to my attention. 6 
can be attributed to different causes. Private property may still be insecure in China, 
while the oligarchs in Russia may have expressed premature demands for political 
power. But there are serious measurement problems in both countries in estimating the 
wealth of the rich. 
It would be more realistic to analyse the top-100 richest individuals, rather than the top-
ten, but unfortunately the resources to carry out such an extensive examination are not 
available. Therefore, this paper presents the findings from a pilot study used to test how 
much we can learn by identifying who the very rich are. Nevertheless, a comparison of 
the three top-ten lists should provide interesting insights.  
First of all, there is substantial deviation among the countries in terms of the volume of 
private wealth. In Russia in order to qualify for the top-ten list, the cut-off point in 2008 
was a fortune worth tens of billions of dollars, while in China one-tenth of this was 
sufficient. In Central Europe, one needs about as much wealth as in China to make the 
Forbes list, although the number of dollar-billionaires in Central Europe is 
approximately ten, much less than in China.  
In the 2008 Forbes list, there are six individuals from Poland (their respective wealth 
estimated to be between US$1-2.6 billion), one9 from the Czech Republic, two from 
Romania, but no-one from Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia or Slovenia. Nevertheless I added 
two Hungarians to the list, Demján and Csányi, since they were certainly very close to the 
billion dollar net worth in 2008. The comparison of the volume of wealth between Russia 
and the Central European countries indicates that the road to wealth was much faster in 
Russia than in Central Europe (or in China). This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
voucher privatization in Russia was a particularly useful tool for the fast appropriation of 
large chunks of public good. In Central Europe where competitive bidding was more 
common, it was difficult to make a killing fast, and the likelihood that foreign firms with 
substantial capital would win the bidding was realistic. The relatively small fortunes of 
the Chinese billionaires are also easy to explain. In China, privatization was delayed for 
the first two decades of market transition, thus the spread of capital accumulation was 
more gradual over a much longer period. 
There is also great variation in the volatility of the three lists. The Central European list 
is, by far, the most stable. Individuals ranking among the top-ten in 2009 had been 
identified for many years among the top 10-25, but this deviates somewhat from the 
billionaires in Russia. The Russian 2008-09 lists are quite stable, but what is most 
interesting is not so much the fact as to who is on the list but rather, who is not. 
Khodorovsky and Berezovsky, two of the leading oligarchs, have dropped from the list 
altogether: both have been (rightly or wrongly) convicted of criminal wrongdoings.10 
None of the wealthy in Central Europe has faced criminal prosecution, with perhaps one 
exception.11 But most noticeable among the rich in China is the volatility (and 
                                                 
9  Petr Kellner, owner of a private equity group (PPF Investment) who made his fortune by cashing in on 
the Czech version of voucher privatization. In 2008 he was listed with a surprising US$9 billion in 
assets). 
10  Berezovsky fled to England, and was convicted in abstentia.  
11 As far as can be ascertained, Dinu Patrciu, a Romanian, had trouble with law enforcement. He was 
briefly detained over irregularities in connection with the privatization of Petromidia, part of 7 
inconsistency) of the estimates. There are two separate sources (Forbes and Hurun) 
available for the estimation of private wealth in China. My Chinese colleagues 
recommended using the Hurun ranking since it is believed to be more reliable, but it is 
intriguing to note how little overlap there is between the two and how much these 
change over time. I consider the lack of volatility to be an indicator of the stability of 
the formation of the grand bourgeoisie. In this respect Hungary seems to be ahead of 
both Russia and China, but even in Russia property rights are more stable near the top 
of the economic hierarchy than in China. Furthermore, as elsewhere in the world, many 
of the very rich in all three country-groups lost substantial fortunes in 2008-09, with 
particularly dramatic losses in Russia. For instance, the wealth of Oleg Deripaska, the 
aluminium king, was estimated at US$28 billion in 2008 but only US$3.5 billion in 
2009, a loss of nearly 90 per cent and a drop from first place to tenth. Even the one of 
most fixed of the Russian oligarchs, Roman Abramovich who has a diversified portfolio 
of oil, aluminium and airlines, lost more than half of his fortune. But despite some 
massive personal losses, the global fiscal crisis did not change the ranking-order needed 
in China or Central Europe to qualify among the top of the propertied class (albeit still 
requiring one to two billion in assets to be listed). The adjustment in Russia was much 
greater: in 2008 to qualify among the top-ten, one needed a fortune valued at US$20+ 
billion, while according to Forbes no-one owned more than US$10 billion in 2009. This 
is probably a reflection of Russia’s dependence on oil and minerals for its wealth, and 
the drop in the rubble value. But it can also be the result of the country’s heavy 
borrowings: in assembling their new fortunes, the bourgeoisie arguably in Russia are 
even more dependent on loans than those in Central Europe or in China. It also should 
be noted that according Forbes, most of the wealth lost in post-socialist countries, 
especially in Russia, was recovered by 2010 while the accumulation of private wealth 
continued in China. For the first time there were more dollar-billionaires in China than 
in Russia, thought the richest individuals in Russia were wealthier than the Chinese. 
Finally, it would appear that the process of class formation in the three regions differs. 
The reliability of the data at my disposal on the methods of wealth accumulation can be 
disputed. Although I am more knowledgeable about the wealthy in Hungary than those 
of the other countries under review, the information even for the Hungarians is based on 
merely reasonably intelligent assumptions. Data for Russia and particularly for China 
are sporadic. Nevertheless, it is striking to note the older age of the Central Europeans, 
and how many more were in managerial, sub-managerial and/or various technocratic 
positions already during socialism. Thus, it would appear that the golden road to the top 
of the new class hierarchy in Central Europe was open to the former socialist 
technocracy. In many cases, they privatized the firms they had managed earlier, or used 
their skills and networks to create new privately-owned companies. In sharp contrast, 
political connections in Russia seemed to have been the main avenue to the grand 
bourgeoisie. The classical political capitalism theory does not hold for Russia. The 
Russian billionaires are very (almost ‘outrageously’) young, eight out of the top-ten are 
still in their forties so they are far too young to have been in major positions before 
transition. But it is a fact that many had/have close personal connections with the new 
political elite (and the new political elite in Russia are from the ranks of the old 
communist elites, as are Yeltsin and Putin). Close ties to the Yeltsin family certainly 
                                                                                                                                               
Rompetrol Group, but was released without charges of wrongdoing (Bucharest Business News Online, 
28 May 2005).  8 
were a good way to become rich, but unable to transfer this liaison to Putin, some lost 
their property as fast as they had accumulated it. Finally, in China, if publicly available 
information is to be trusted, most, if not all, of the new wealth is held by those who 
started small businesses that eventually prospered. In a way, it is the classical road to 
capitalism. Given Chinese Communist Party’s continued commitment to the notion that 
it is a ‘socialist country’ and given the increasing strength of the state after 1989, the 
newly wealthy cannot survive without establishing and maintaining close relationships 
with political authorities (almost to the point of occasionally appearing to be corrupt). 
Nevertheless the genesis of China’s new wealth is not political office, or clientelism, but 
private entrepreneurship. 
Next, each of the three country-groups is reviewed in detail with regard to the 
characteristics of those who made it to the upper echelons of society and how they 
might have achieved that status. 
3.1  Billionaires in Central Europe 
The picture would be strikingly different if Ukraine had been included. Ukraine has a 
number of dollar-billionaires, including Rinat Akhmetov,12 and Victor Pinchuk. The 
wealth of these men was estimated by Forbes to be several billion dollars. But the 
character of Ukrainian billionaires, much like the character of the Ukrainian economy, 
is closer to Russian patrimonialism than to the neoliberalism of Central Europe.13 
By all estimates, the wealthiest person in the former European socialist countries 
outside the former USSR is Petr Kellner.14 He graduated from the University of 
Economics in Prague during the late 1980s where he studied industrial economics. In 
1990 he began to work for the Czech company, Impromat, which imported and sold 
Ricohet photocopiers. This is where he met Milan Madĕryč and Milan Winkler, a 
turning point in his life. When the Czech government announced its scheme of voucher 
privatization, these men moved in to jointly create in 1991 an investment fund PPF 
(Privni privatizačni fond), by buying up the privatization vouchers and purchasing 
stocks of more than 200 corporations. Not only is Kellner’s wealth15 comparable to 
some of the Russian oligarchs, but so is the manner in which he enriched himself. It 
would appear that when a country selects voucher privatization as its major property 
transfer scheme, it can inflate the ways in which private wealth is generated. In 1995 
Kellner already had sufficient resources (vouchers and inexpensive loans) to buy a 20 
per cent stake in the largest Czech Insurance company, Česká pojišt’ovna, and later in 
Komerčni Bank. In 2000 he took advantage of a bitter confrontation between the 
American cosmetics billionaire Ronald Lauder and Czech businessman Vladimir 
Zelezny16 and invested extensively in the popular Czech Nova TV, the target of the 
bidding rivalry between Lauder and Zelezny. Kellner eventually sold his stake to 
                                                 
12  Akhmetove, the owner of System Capital Management, is believed to be a protégée of former Prime 
Minister Viktor Janukovich; Pinchuk is the president of investment groups Intertpipe and Maecenas, 
the son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma.  
13  See www.goodlifenews.net/in/158. 
14  See www.lonelycitynews.com/powerful-players-Petr-Kellner. 
15  His wealth estimated to be five times that of other Central European nouveau riche. 
16  See www.globalbusinessleaders.org/WebPage/LeaderBio.aspx?leaderCd=100&levelcd=c03r009. 9 
Lauder at a massive profit (over 0.5 billion dollars). In 2007 PPF signed a contract with 
Assicurazioni Generali and created a region-wide insurance business in Central and 
Eastern Europe. PPF is currently exploring investment opportunities in other transitional 
economies, especially in Russia, Ukraine, China and Vietnam.17 While other investors 
became cautious during the 2008-09 global fiscal crisis, Kellner used this opportunity to 
buy and expand,18 becoming embroiled in early 2009 in the process in legal battles with 
Oleg Deripaska over the Russian insurance company Igosstrach.19 
There are parallels in the backgrounds of the Polish and Hungarian billionaires. Many of 
the Poles came from the private economy that was evident already during socialism 
(Ryszard Krauze and Boguslaw Cupial in particular: born before 1960, they all tend to 
be somewhat older). Leszek Czarnecki and Michal Solowow were both in their twenties 
in 1989 (both were born in 1962), both graduated from engineering college and both 
started their careers after the change in regime. The story of Jan Wejchert (and his close 
business partner Mariusz Walter) is rather interesting. He is some ten years older than 
either Czarnecki or Solowow and gained business experience abroad after 1968. It is 
likely that the Wejchert-Walter duo had some political connections already under 
socialism.  
Table 1 






2009  Main business  Source of wealth 
1 Petr Kellner, 
Czech Republic 
9.3 billion  44  Investment, insurance, 
banking 
Voucher privatization 
2 Leszek Czarnecki 
Poland 
2.6 billion  47  Leasing, banking, 
insurance, real estate 
Technocracy, second 
economy 
3 Dinu Patriciu 
Romania 
2.5 billion  58  Oil  Technocracy, MBO 
4 Michal Solowow 
Poland 
1.9 billion  46  Media, chemical industry, 
ceramics, real estate 
Privatization of public firms 
with subsidized government 
loans 
5 Jan Wejchert 
Poland 
1.3 billion  59  Media  Foreign experience, possible 
political connection? 
6 Ryszard Krauze 
Poland 
1.3 billion  52  Software, pharmaceutical, 
oil 
Private business during 
socialism with government 
contracts, political 
connections 
7 Ion Tiriac 
Romania 
1.2 billion  69  Banking, insurance, real 
estate 
Foreign experience 
8 Boguslaw Cupial 
Poland 
1 billion  52  Telecommunication,  
cable production 
Second economy 
9 Sándor Demján 
Hungary 
1 billion  66  Real estate  Technocracy, second 
economy 
10 Sándor Csányi 
Hungary 
1 billion  56  Banking  Technocracy, MBO 
Note:  Demján and Csányi have been added to the list by the author. 
Source:   Forbes (2008). 
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One of the two Romanian billionaires, Dinu Patriciu, is a typical example of a 
technocrat who earned his wealth through management buyouts. The other billionaire, 
Ion Tiriac, used the skills, connections and assets accumulated while working in the 
west to assemble his business empire. Thus the Czech, Polish and Romanian 
billionaires, although individually following different trajectories of wealth 
accumulation, are in fact rather similar with the super-rich in Hungary but quite 
different from the nouveau riche in Russia or China. 
Leszek Czarnecki,20 a native of Wroclaw, graduated from the Wroclaw University of 
Technology with a PhD in economics. He became a businessman in 1986 when he 
created Przedsiębiorstwo Hydrotechniki i Inźynierii TAN S.A. In 1991 he joined the 
first Polish leasing company, Europejski Fundusz Leasongowy, which eventually 
became the country’s largest leasing firm. Some ten years later, he sold his shares to the 
French bank Credit Agricole at a substantial profit. His flagship is the Bank Getin 
Holding and, as with many other Polish billionaires, an important source of wealth was 
the extraordinary growth of the Polish stock market around the middle of the first 
decade of 2000. Czarnecki is quite an adventurer, a sports fanatic, a deep sea driver, and 
he is rumoured to have paid US$20 million for a seat on a flight to the international 
space station; a trip he has not taken yet. 
A native of Kielce, Michal Solowow,21 also has an engineering degree from the local 
college. Upon graduation, he set up a construction company during the mid 1980s with 
an initial investment of US$10,000. Selling this firm in 2002 for US$44 million, he 
focused on Barlinek, turning it into one of the world’s largest floorboard producers. His 
other assets include a ceramics production firm (Cersanit), a real estate company (Echo) 
and the daily Zycie Warszawy. Like Czarnecki, Solowow is also a sports adventurer, and 
a rather well-known racing driver. He started racing at the age of 17, but could afford to 
buy his first car only in 2000. He races some 20 days a year and has had some success, 
placing 4th, for instance, in 2007 in the general classification of the European Rally 
Championship. 
Jan Wejchert and Mariusz Walter started to work together in the mid-1980s. Jan 
Wejchert left Poland temporarily in 1968 to work for a while in England, France and 
Switzerland. Already in 1976 he was responsible for the Polish subsidiary in Frankfurt 
of the German trading company, Kosnoprod GMBH Co., the first western firm to invest 
in Poland. In 1984 he joined forces with Mariusz Walter and set up the ITI 
(International Trading and Investment). Responding to the demand of the market, they 
initially produced potato chips but then branched out into video production. After the 
fall of communism ITI managed amid intense competition with major entrepreneurs 
(e.g., Ronald Lauder) to expand into the leading media and entertainment group of 
Central Europe. In 1997 they became the majority stakeholders in TVN, Poland’s major 
commercial TV network. TVN is available via air or cable to almost all Polish 
households and has been listed since 2004 on the Warsaw Stock Market. In 1999 ITI 
launched Onet.pl, the major Polish internet portal. Jan Wejchart’s son, Lukasz Wejchert 
(a graduate from Dublin Portobello Business College), was initially the vice president of 
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Onet.Pl, but has been its interim president since 2004. Jan Weichert passed away during 
the fall of 2009. 
Mariusz Walter22 graduated from Gliwice Institute of Technology. During the 1960s he 
worked for a student radio station and eventually got a position with the Polish Public 
Radio. After moving in 1963 to Warsaw, he joined the Polish Public Television, rising 
through the ranks to editor-in-chief. He has produced some 300 television programmes, 
numerous documentaries and has become one of the best-known media personalities 
before he left the television world in 1982 to join forces in 1984 with Jan Wejchert in 
various business ventures. 
Jan Wejchert and Mariusz Walter have turned their business empire into a family firm. 
Mariusz Walter passed the presidency of TVN to his son Piotr Walter, while Lukasz 
Wejchert assumed the role of vice president. The board of Jan Wejchert’s political and 
educational foundation, Politikos,23 consists almost exclusively of Wejchert family 
members. ITI owns Multikino, one of Poland’s leading multiplex cinema operations, 
with Jan Wejchert’s wife (Aldona Wejchert) as the president of the management board. 
Bozena Walter (Mariusz Walter’s wife) and Aldona Wejchert both serve on the Charity 
Foundation of TVN, Nie Jersteś Sam. Graduating from the Warsaw School of 
Economics, Aldona Wejchert completed her education at LSE; Bozena Walter has a 
degree in oriental philology from the Jagiellonian University. Undoubtedly, this is one 
of the new great family dynasties in the making in Poland. 
The business success of the Wejchert-Walter families seems to have roots similar to 
those of the nouveau riche in Central Europe. The families were also well endowed in 
cultural capital: Wejchert benefited from his experiences abroad and western business 
networks. Both families must have been relatively well-off already prior to transition 
(hence, their access to initial capital). But they were not immune to speculation that they 
might have been able to cash in on political capital as well. In 2007 the-then Polish 
Minister of Defence, Antoni Macierewicz, issued a report ‘on the activities of soldiers 
and civil employees of WSI’ (Polish Military Agency), claiming that Jan Wejchert was 
actively cooperating with the Polish special military services and was engaged in the 
set-up of spy network in West European countries.24 ITI sued and, according to an ITI 
press release, the Ministry of Defence issued the following apology: 
Acting on behalf of the State Treasury, the Minister of Defence 
apologizes to Mr Jan Wejchert, Mr Mariusz Walter and the ITI Group for 
the violation of their personal interests by including in the report 
prepared by the Chairman of the Verification Committee, published in 
Monitor Polski no. 11 of 16.02.2007, unauthorized, injurious 
information, questioning their business trustworthiness, claiming that Mr 
Jan Wejchert, Mr Mariusz Walter and the ITI Group were cooperating 
with the special military services of the People’s Republic of Poland 
(PRL), participated in placing agents of the PRL military intelligence in 
Western European countries and financed the agents’ operation. The 
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Minister of Defence expresses his profound regrets that such situation 
took place.  
It is an interesting apology and it is also interesting to note that Wejchert and Walter 
obviously were satisfied since they made it public through a press release.  
The third wealthiest Central European on the 2008 Forbes list is Dinu Patriciu (born in 
1950). Trained as an architect at the Bucharest Institute of Architecture, he has held a 
professorship there since 1975. He started out in the real estate business, built more than 
forty housing and commercial projects in Romania, but also in the United Arab 
Emirates. In 1998 he led an investor buyout of Rompetrol SA., expanded it into 
Rompetrol Group, NV (TRG), served on its supervisory board from its inception as 
private company and became CEO in 2001. Patriciu and TRG have been active in the 
Balkans and in Central Asia (including Georgia and Kazakhstan). He was also involved 
in politics, and was member of the Romanian Parliament for a number of years 
(although he retired from political office in 2003, he still seems to exercise substantial 
political influence, perhaps not only in Romania but even in Moldova). This again is an 
example of the interaction of politics and business, where business uses politics, rather 
than politics utilizing private wealth. 
Nevertheless, the business-politics interaction is never one way. Patriciu was accused of 
corruption a number of times and was investigated on charges of organized crime and 
insider information. In 2005 he was briefly arrested and questioned 25 about the 
operations of Petromidia, part of TRG but as far as can be determined, he was never 
charged with criminal activity. 
Ion Tiriac26 was listed in the 2008 Forbes as the seventh wealthiest Central European 
entrepreneur. He started out as a hockey player, taking part as a member of the 
Romanian national team in the 1964 Winter Olympics. Soon he switched to tennis and 
won the men’s double (with Ilie Nastase in the 1970 French Open) and reached the 
Davis Cup finals several times. In 1983 he became a tennis coach, working, for 
instance, with Boris Becker for almost a decade, starting from the mid-1980s. When he 
discovered Becker he was ranked 174th in the world, but within a year, Becker won the 
Wimbledon at the age of 17. Once Tiriac withdrew from sports, he concentrated on 
business in Germany. 
After ten years of self-imposed exile, Tiriac returned to Romania after the fall of 
communism, armed with considerable experience of western market economies as well 
as some initial capital. As manager, he had earned a percentage of the endorsement 
income of his trainees (about 30 per cent) as well as some of the prize money. For 
example, he had signed up Becker with Ford, Coca-Cola, Deutsche Bank, etc., 
endorsements that earned Becker millions of dollars each year. On his return home, he 
was a national hero, at least among ordinary people, as the man who, during the dark 
years of Ceausescu, made the world remember that there was a country called Romania. 
In 199127 he founded the Banca Tiriac, the first private bank in post-communist 
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Romania. He has a diverse portfolio: real estate development (building residential 
complexes in Bucharest, Timisoara, Braşov, Sibiu), insurance business, airlines, 
car dealerships and car leasing. 
Tiriac’s only son is Ion Alexander Tiriac, Jr. His mother is Mikette von Issenberg, a 
famous model in her day, whom Tiriac met in Paris in 1974. Ion Jr. was 14 years old, 
when  People Magazine (1991) interviewed his father. He was sitting in the corner 
quietly during the interview and said in passing: ‘I want to do like my father, but less. 
He does too much’ and when the conversation turned to his father’s hunting habit (Ion 
Tiriac Sr. is an avid hunter), he added: ‘I’m not such good shot with pheasants, but I am 
not so bad with wolves. This early interview seems to explain a lot about Tiriac, both in 
terms of his attitude towards hard work and hunting. So far, Tiriac Junior has attracted 
quite a bit of media attention—not because of his business success, but because of his 
colourful personal life. He fell in love with Ilena Lazariuc, the actress/model daughter 
of the Romanian pop singer star, Anastasia Lazariuc. Before their marriage in August 
2009 the couple had been linked to a drug scandal.28 All this may change with the 
stabilizing effect of marriage, and the Lazariuc-Tiriac family may become a new 
dynasty in Romania. 
As far as can be determined, the emerging bourgeoisie society in Central Europe was 
never a part of the Communist Party’s entourage of high state officials. The rise to the 
top of the social ladder was more likely to have been related to their professional skills, 
an early kick-off in the grey or informal economy, useful foreign experiences and good 
personal networks.  
Sándor Csányi was born into a poor agrarian family in Hungary but graduated in 1974 
with a college degree majoring in accounting. After graduation he got a job at the 
prestigious ministry of finance where he worked in the bank supervisory unit until 1983. 
After leaving the ministry, Csányi held a couple of jobs in various new banks (during 
the 1980s Hungary began to set up new commercial banks and to work for these was a 
challenge for young bankers). In 1992 he was appointed CEO of the-then still publicly 
owned saving bank, OTP. When the government in 1994 decided to privatize OTP, 
Csányi could have followed the lead of other Hungarian banks to approach a western 
bank that might have been interested in buying OTP.29 But Csányi was more ambitious: 
he decided to put OTP on the stock market and to give stock options to himself and 
other top management members of the bank (a sort of MBO). Many of his colleagues, 
who had sold their banks to foreign investors had kept their managerial jobs, thus 
securing their position within the Hungarian upper middle class as extremely well-paid 
professionals.30 Csányi, on the other hand, took the risky road and became one of the 
leading members of the Hungarian grand bourgeoisie.  
Sándor Demján graduated from college with a major in commerce in 1965. He started 
to work with AFESZ, a network of formal corporative, in fact, state-owned stores. Very 
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early he made some innovative moves, the most important of which was to establish in 
1973 a new department store (Skala) which he ran like a private business with 
extraordinary success. In 1986 he created the first socialist commercial bank (Hungarian 
Credit Bank) and in 1996 TriGranit. This eventually grew into one of the largest real 
estate development firms with operations all over Central Europe.  
It is also interesting to note that Csányi clashed in 2008-09 with the Hungarian 
intelligence services (who released a taped phone conversation of Csányi with a private 
investigation firm which implied that he might have been involved in information 
gathering on politicians whom he would have wanted removed from office). But he was 
not even questioned by the prosecutor’s office; rather, it was the minister responsible for 
intelligence services and the chief of intelligence who was forced to resign over the 
affair. Initially the tape was released to stir up a case against Csányi in his attempts to 
gather illegal information on politicians, but this turned into an issue of the intelligence 
services illegally taping Csányi’s phone conversation and illegally releasing the tapes. 
The narratives of Wejchert-Walter and Csányi demonstrate that businessmen are beyond 
the reach of harassment by the intelligence or politicians in Hungary. Here the clout of 
business is in sharp contrast to that in Russia or China where businessmen, once they 
fall out of favour, often end of in jail or in exile. 
3.2  Billionaires in Russia 
Mass privatization in Russia was organized mainly through vouchers (King 2002, 2003; 
Murrell 1993). Yeltsin’s main economic adviser, Gaidar, who eventually became 
prime minister, promised the people of Russia ‘capitalism within one hundred days’. 
And, in a sense, he did deliver: property relations were transformed extremely fast, not 
quite in a hundred days, but it did not take much longer to form ‘identifiable property 
 
Table 2 






2009  Main business  Source of wealth 
1 Deripaska, Oleg  28 billion  41  Aluminium  New private business, MBO and 
political capital  
2 Abramovich, Roman  24 billion  43  Oil, aluminium, airlines  Informal economy and political 
capital 
3 Mordashov, Alexei  21 billion  43  Steel  MBO 
4 Fridman, Mikhail  21 billion  45  Finance, banking, oil  Second economy, political 
capital 
5 Lisin, Vladimir  20 billion  53  Steel, metallurgy  Political capital, MBO 
6 Prokharov, Mikhail  20 billion  44  Financial, metallurgy  MBO, political capital 
7 Potanin, Vladimir  19 billion  48  Metallurgy, aluminium  Political capital, MBO 
8 Kerimov, Suleiman  18 billion  43  Oil  Political capital 
9 Khan, German  14 billion  47  Oil  New private business, social 
network 
10 Alekperov, Vagit   13 billion  58  Oil  Socialist technocracy, MBO, 
political capital 
Source: Forbes (2008). 15 
rights’, the aim of neoliberal reforms. In the voucher system, all firm employees 
received vouchers or coupons worth a certain share of the firm. This can be interpreted 
as a ‘socialist policy’ based on some type of Proudhonian inspiration: everyone was to 
become a private proprietor. But in practice the voucher system turned out to be a major 
avenue for management buyouts and, in fact, even an effective way to allocate property 
to well-connected people able to assess the real value of these publicly-owned firms. 
Soon, a secondary market developed for the vouchers: workers, not knowing what to do 
with their vouchers and not having enough to utilize them to any advantage, generally 
sold them well below their nominal price.  
Privatization in Russia proceeded in three steps 
The first of the oligarchs, Berezovsky, describes this process astutely: ‘The first stage is 
privatization of profits. The second is the privatization of property, and the third is the 
privatization of debts’, cited in Klebnikov (2000: 170). 
The privatization of profits occurred very early. Once Gaidar liberalized prices, it 
unleashed hyperinflation within a few weeks. This enabled the new private 
entrepreneurs to purchase goods from still publicly-owned firms with promissory notes 
rather than cash, sell the products at high prices and repay their loans to producers once 
the value of the rubble plummeted, and securing profits in hard currency with western 
banks. 
The second stage, privatization of property, was set into motion when President Yeltsin 
announced in 1992 the plan for voucher privatization: ‘We need millions of owners, 
rather than a handful of millionaires… The privatization voucher is a ticket for each of 
us to a free economy’, said the President.31 Chubais, the future vice premier, was 
responsible for privatization. Under his watch, privatization vouchers were mailed out 
to all Russian citizens, who were at a lost as to what to do with them. But as hyper-
inflation had eroded their savings, and their jobs had been lost, people readily offered 
their coupons for sale virtually at any price on the emerging secondary market. A small 
group of entrepreneurs and business-minded managerial personnel bought up the 
vouchers, privatizing state-owned enterprises well below their value. Klebnikov, for 
instance, estimates (2000: 135) that Gazprom, which sold for US$250 million in 1994, 
was worth US$40 billion by 1997 (Klebnikov 2000: 135). 
The third stage, privatization of debts, was the ‘loans-for-shares’ system implemented 
by Chubais in mid-1995. Vladimir Potanin is known to have been the architect of this 
scheme. The central idea was for the leading Russian banks to offer US$2 billion to the 
government, with the most productive still state-owned firms as collateral. Since the 
government was unable to repay the loans, the banks became owners of the companies 
in a second round of auctions (ibid.:198). 
Elements of voucher privatization were present in other European post-communist 
economies. The voucher system was used in the Czech Republic: this was how Kellner, 
the wealthiest post-communist entrepreneur outside Russia, earned, or rather ‘gained’ 
his fortune. Similar techniques were applied in Hungary, where the government issued 
the so-called ‘compensation tickets’. These were vouchers which in principle reflected 
the value of property lost through confiscation or nationalization during communism. 
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Although these could be used for privatization, most recipients did not have enough 
compensation tickets for any meaningful action, so they sold their shares on the 
secondary market, generally well below nominal value. Investors with proper 
information and connections often made a killing this way.  
In Russia, however, privatization by voucher was the main method of transferring 
property rights and this offered a unique opportunity to become rich fast for the young 
smart entrepreneurial people who were close to the well-connected elite. Crucial in 
Russia was how close one could get to Yeltsin, and specifically to his daughter, Tatyana 
Yeltsin. Those who managed to get close to father and daughter constituted what 
eventually became known as the oligarchs.32 
The unique features of Russia’s transition to capitalism were (i) the importance of 
having access to Yeltsin and the new political elite in order to take advantage of 
voucher privatization; (ii) the emerging oligarchs formed a tightly connected group in a 
personal and business sense; and (iii) wealth had been received as ‘patrimony’ from 
Yeltsin, so when Putin came to power, property rights had to be renegotiated. Only 
those who were able convince the new ‘tsar’ of their loyalty managed to retain their 
property (as did Roman Abramovich). The relationship between the ruler and property 
holders appears to be a rather traditional dilemma in Russia. 
Boris Berezovsky (born in 1946)33 was the first and the most prominent of the new 
‘nobility’, or the founding member of the club of oligarchs. Berezovsky earned in 1983 
a PhD in mathematics, becoming director of one of the laboratories at the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences (Klebnikov 2000: 53). But he was more interested in networking 
and business than in science. As a member of the scientist elite, he could by-pass the 
small shops phase, and concentrate on the existing large state-owned firms. Already in 
1989 he approached Avtovaz, the Soviet car manufacturer, and proposed setting up a 
private firm to provide computer programming for them. Avtovaz was interested, and in 
May 1989 Berezovsky established Logovaz, with himself as its general director 
(Klebnikov 2000: 53-4). But computer servicing was not sufficiently innovative for 
Berezovsky, so almost immediately Logovaz took on the sale of Avtovaz automobiles. 
Apparently, his first profit of a few thousand dollars was made from the re-sale of a 
Mercedes he bought secondhand in Germany and sold in Russia, but he also made 
money from the import of computers and computer software. His most profitable 
venture was the re-export of cars. He managed to get an export license for cars and 
since it was assumed that he would export the highly non-marketable Lada, he was able 
to buy these at less than production costs, paying in promissory notes rather than cash. 
But Berezovsky never exported the cars, preferring instead to sell them on the Russian 
market, well over the official price. Many wanting a car would have had to wait for 
years for one from Avtovaz; at Berezovsky’s outlets, they could simply sit in a car and 
drive away.  
There seems to be no indication that Berezovsky was closely linked with high-ranking 
Soviet party officials. He had good relations with the young reformers, Yegor Gaidar 
and Anatoly Chubais in particular (Klebnikov: 2000: 75) and Valentin Yumashev. 
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Yumashev was a journalist who eventually became Yeltsin’s chief of staff and Tanya 
(or Tatyana) Yeltsin’s second husband. But during the early 1990s Chubais was a 
ghostwriter for President Yeltsin, helping him with his 1989 book and with the Notes of 
a President (published in 1994). It was Yumashev who introduced Berezovsky to 
Tatyana, married at that time to Dyachenko (a commodity trader, who later became 
Berezovsky’s business partner in Sibneft), but already a good friend of Yumashev. 
Valery Streletsky who served as head of the anti-corruption department of the 
Presidential Security Services stated during an interview with Klebnikov (2000: 202-3):  
The key factor in the privatization process was the attitude of Tatyana 
Dyachenko to this or that banker/oligarch  ….  She would go to the 
president and say: this man is good man and that man is bad man; this 
should be supported and that should not be supported  …  Tatyana 
Dyachenko is the only person the president listens to. 
Berezovsky’s entry into the family was via the Notes of a President. He had suggested 
to Yumashev/Tatyana Dyachenko that he would take care of the publication of the 
book, get it printed in Finland and come up with the money to cover costs. He did come 
up with the cash and offered to transfer the royalties to Yeltsin’s account. The actual 
financial arrangements of the agreement are unclear: did he take a fee for himself, 
transfer all royalties, or transfer funds even beyond the royalties earned by the 
president? Berezovsky probably did meet Yeltsin for the first time in person when the 
book was released, yet Yeltsin offered a toast and his thanks to Berezovsky at that time. 
With his newly acquired contacts Berezovsky managed to acquire major managerial 
positions and eventual ownership of Avtovaz, the car manufacturer, as well as shares in 
the Russian national airline, Aeroflot, and in a major oil company Sibneft but his 
economic empire also included the aluminium industry and some important media 
outlets. In 1995 he also acquired the most popular TV station in Russia, TV Channel 1, 
which had a tremendous impact on public opinion in the country (Klebnikov 2000: 
159). 
In appreciation of Yeltsin’s contribution to his business success, in 1996 when a 
communist candidate represented a real threat to Yeltsin’s re-election, Berezovsky not 
only supported the president’s campaign but managed to persuade six other oligarchs, 
the so-called ‘big seven’34 to push for Yeltin’s re-election.  
In addition to Berezovsky, other members of the ‘big seven’ were Mikhail Fridman 
(fourth place in the 2008 list), Vladimir Vinogradov (bankruptcy in 1998), Mikhail 
Khodorovsky (currently in jail), Vladimir Gusinsky (currently in exile in Israel), 
Vladimir Potanin (seventh ranking on the 2008 list) and Aleksander Smolensky (his 
bank collapsed in the 1998 Russian financial crisis). 
In 2000 Berezovsky and some other (still existing members) of the ‘big seven’ (namely 
Khodorovsky and Fridman) supported Putin’s election, and were bringing Putin ‘into 
the family’, to use a mafia term. But Putin did not want to be bossed around by the 
oligarchs. Berezovsky had been elected to Duma (the Russian legislature) in 1999 and 
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held various important political positions under Yeltsin, but he soon clashed with Putin 
and fled to England. Later he was sentenced in abstentia to prison. While no murder 
charges were proven against him in a fair court of law, he was suspected of being 
involved in the 1995 slaying of Vlad Listyev, Russia’s most successful TV producer. 
Berezovsky vehemently denied any involvement. Listyev had supported privatization of 
TV 1, but had advocated fair bidding for advertising time. This clashed with 
Berezovsky’s interests. It is also interesting to note that Paul Klebnikov, an American 
journalist of Russian descent and the author of the book Godfather of the Kremlin which 
describes Berezovsky as a mafia boss, was murdered in 2004. In Putin’s Russia, 
Berezovsky himself is now public enemy number one: several assassination attempts 
against Berezovsky are rumoured to have taken place in London by Russian agents (The 
Times, 18 July 2007).  
Mikhail Khodorovsky started his career in Komsomol, the Soviet Communist Youth 
Organization and used his political connections effectively. Klebnikov (2000: 203) 
offers a crisp description of his trajectory: 
He had a classic career path of a Yeltsin–era business magnate. In 1987, 
as top leader of Moscow’s Communist Youth League, Khodorovsky 
established a trading cooperative financed with Communist Party money; 
the following year he established a bank. In 1990-93, Khodorovsky 
entered the Russian government, serving first as economic adviser to the 
Russian Prime Minister and then as deputy minister of fuel and energy. 
His first business venture was, in fact, a coffee-shop before he set up his bank, Menatep. 
At a loans-for-shares auction in 1995, he acquired ownership of Yukos, one of 
Russian’s major oil companies. Fridman’s Alfa Bank in consortium with other investors 
also made a bid for Yukos, offering US$350 million. But the government had asked 
Menatep to register auction applications; Menatep disqualified Alfa Bank, and a front 
company for Menatep purchased Yukos for a mere US$150 million. According to 
Klebnikov (2000: 209), this was a rather typical technique at auctions. During an 
interview with Colonel Streletsky, the colonel said:  
Why did the state sell its property so cheaply? Because this was a corrupt 
clan selling to itself … A certain proportion of the government apparatus 
had linked up with  ….  Berezovsky and other [businessmen]. These 
people knew the best way to steal, but to steal they needed the 
government apparatus. The government apparatus, meanwhile, needed 
money, so this alliance was concluded (Klebnikov (2000: 209). 
By the end of the Yeltsin era, Khodorovsky was considered the wealthiest individual in 
Russia. But much like Berezovsky, Khodorovsky was politically far too ambitious for 
Putin’s liking. Khodorovsky probably sensed trouble with the new political boss, so 
early in 2003 he proposed a merger of Yukos with Sibneft, Russia’s other major oil 
company. When Berezovsky fled the country, he had passed ownership of Sibneft to 
Roman Abramovich (number two man on the list of wealthiest Russians as recently as 
2009), who had regarded Berezovksy as his ‘mentor’. The friendship, however, was not 
without qualms: Berezovsky sued Abramovich, claiming he was not properly 
compensated for his shares. Berezovsky had attempted already in 1998 to merge Yukos 
and Sibneft into a gigantic oil firm, Yuksi, but failed because of resistance by 
Abramovich at that time (Klebnikov (2000: 276). In 2003, however, Abramovich agreed 19 
to the Yukos-Sibneft merger. Khodorovsky, accused of tax evasion and fraud, was 
subsequently arrested in the fall of 2003, was still in jail in the summer of 2010, and is 
likely to be there for some time. This means that Abramovich now controls a big chunk 
of Russia’s oil industry and eventually the Berezovsky-Abramovich controversy was 
also settled. 
Vladimir Gusinsky,35 the third oligarch to fall under Putin’s disfavour, started out as a 
self-made man. Gusinsky was engaged in semi-private ventures already during the 
communist era, gradually moving into media ownership. He started out in the 1970s as a 
gypsy cabdriver (Klebnikov (2000: 276), but was also engaged in various black market 
activities (ibid.: 151-2). Gusinsky’s political connections helped him to build his media 
empire. During the 1980s he organized various events for Komsomol, becoming in 1986 
director of the so-called goodwill games, a popular TV programme sponsored by the 
Komsomol. In 1989 he created Most, a joint venture with an American firm (Most 
means bridge), which initially did consultancy work only, but expanded into a bank and 
a holding company, one of the largest in post-communist Russia. During the late 1980s, 
he met Yuri Luzhkov who in time became Moscow’s mayor (rather successful, albeit 
somewhat controversial) and one of the major political rivals to President Yeltsin. 
Gusinsky and Luzhkov became good friends: they even travelled together to the United 
Sates on a tour. Luzhkov’s friendship was apparently helpful in turning Most into one of 
the largest business conglomerates in Russia. Most had an armed security force of 
1,000, and one of the leaders of this force was a former high-ranking KGB officer. 
When the Americans, with whom Gusinsky was on rather good terms, complained 
about his employment of a former KGB agent, he commented: ‘The [KGB] people are 
like fine cars. They’ll go wherever you drive them….We’d be ready to hire the devil if 
he could give us security’ (Klebnikov 2000: 151).36 Indeed, during the early 1990s, 
major businessmen in Moscow needed security forces because the city was ruled by 
either Russian or Chechen mobs. Without protection from one group or the other, life 
was virtually impossible. Klebnikov claims Berezovsky had protection from the 
Chechens, while Gusinsky preferred Russian ‘protectors’. Hence, Berezovsky and 
Gusinsky (both are Jewish) were not just business rivals siding with different political 
mentors, but they were also protected by competing security outfits. Not surprising, 
then, that they suspected each other of being responsible for the assassination attempts 
against them and for the plots for their arrest by law-enforcement agencies. The two 
giant oligarchs sat down around 1996 and agreed to cooperate rather than to try to 
destroy one another. It is likely that Luzhkov helped Gusinsky to gain control of 
Channel 4. The media in Gusinsky’s control was quite critical of Yeltsin, but 
Berezovsky persuaded him in 1996 to support Yeltsin and to prevent the election of a 
communist as president. Putin, however, did not tolerate the critical tone of Gusinsky’s 
media. Gusinsky was accused of fraud and, at the request of the Russians, was arrested 
in Athens in 2003. By that time he had taken the safety precaution of living in Israel, 
and was allowed to return to Israel (rather than being extradited to Russia) only at the 
intervention of the US government. 
Although Roman Abramovich was not a member of the ‘big seven’ club, he was still 
one of the early oligarchs. He was brought into the Kremlin circle by Berezovsky, even 
                                                 
35 See www.how-to-make-million-dollars.com/russian-billionaires/gusinsky.html. 
36 See also Washington Post, 7 April 1995. 20 
moving to live inside the Kremlin. He became a close friend of Yeltsin’s daughter, 
Tatyana Yeltsin, who often spent time at Abramovich’s dacha. 
Abramovich, similarly to Gusinsky, started out in the shadow economy. It is rumoured 
that he began his business activities during the late 1980s by selling plastic ducks out of 
his Moscow apartment and working as a street trader.37 Later he set up a number of 
small companies. In 1993 he met Berezovsky, who liked him and introduced him to the 
‘family’. After Yeltsin created Sibneft by presidential decree in 1995, the two men 
acquired the company in a loans-for-shares programme, paying approximately US$80 
million for the whole lot. Already then, it must have been worth several billion.38 This 
is a classical—and much debated—example of Russian privatization. Abramovich after 
a time also branched into the aluminium business. Privatization of the aluminium 
industry was surrounded by hostilities, rumours of corruption, blackmail and even the 
murder of plant managers and journalists.39 
Abramovich is a survivor. He has not only survived the aluminium war, but also the 
change in regime from Yeltsin to Putin. In 1999 he was elected to the Duma and in 2000 
the governor of Chukotka. When Putin cancelled the governorship elections in 2005, he 
re-appointed Abramovich to serve a second term as governor (although Abramovich 
resigned from this post a few years later). Abramovich’s survival may be due to the fact 
that he kept a low profile at least until quite recently, unlike Berezovky or 
Khodorovsky. Only few people knew what he looked like: at one point, a newspaper 
offered a reward to the first person to photograph him. After 1999 he has become better 
known. 
Oleg Deripaska (regarded in 2008 as the wealthiest Russian)40 is also in the ‘family’ in 
more ways than one. He became related through marriage to the Yeltsin family—his 
wife is Polina Yumashev, whose father, Valentin Yumashev, was chief of staff and son-
in-law of President Yeltsin (Yumashev is Tatyana’s second husband, which makes 
Polina Tatyana’s step-daughter). Deripaska also had close ties with Abramovich: they 
jointly created RusAl. Deripaska was only 23 year old when the Soviet Union collapsed, 
but was already in 1994 chief financial officer of Aluminproduct and he used this 
position to acquire aluminium plants with vouchers. After Putin’s rise to power, given 
Deripaska’s close ties to Yeltsin, he was assumed to be the next to face accusations of 
tax evasion, fraud or corruption. He has, nevertheless, not only survived so far, but has 
in fact blossomed (he lost a large chunk of his fortune in the 2008-09 recession but 
regained most of it due to government bail-out). His success was clearly due to talent, 
seizing opportunities as they opened up through voucher privatization and being in a 
position to take advantage of these opportunities. Of course, Deripaska’s membership in 
the ‘family’, his personal ties to Yeltsin and to members of the oligarchy were a great 
help. 
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Like Deripaska, some other members of Russia’s wealthiest top-ten began their business 
ventures with buyouts attained through vouchers. Alexei Mordashov, financial officer of 
a steel mill, was in his early thirties when privatization started.41 Advised by an elderly 
mill manager to buy vouchers to make sure the company did not fall into the hands of 
outsiders, Mordashov bought most of the vouchers for himself. Currently, his firm, 
Severstal, is Russia’s third largest steel company. Age-wise, Vladimir Lisin is one of the 
oldest of the Russian top-ten. He was born in 1956 (Deripaska was born in 1968, 
Mordashov in 1966). Most of the super-rich were born during the 1960s, with the 
exception of Lisin and Alekperov. Lisin started out as a welder, but had been promoted 
to various managerial positions already during the 1980s. He became a member of the 
board of directors of a major steel company, Novolipetsk (and in time, its chair). 
Gradually, by acquiring Novolipetsk stock, Lisin became its sole owner in 2002. The 
company was listed on the London Stock exchange in 2005, which substantially boosted 
his wealth.42 Mikhail Prokhorov was the chairman of the board of Onemix Bank in 
1993 when the Russian government launched privatization. Working with Vladimir 
Potanin, he used the bank for the acquisition of Norilsk Nickel. He managed the firm 
well, sold its unprofitable non-mining operations and turned it into one of the most 
profitable natural resource corporations in the world. 
Among the Russian oligarchs, Mikhail Fridman exemplifies the new rich who started 
operating in the informal economy. Fridman used his political connections only later in 
the process, when he was already on his way to wealth. Fridman’s first business venture 
in the 1980s was selling theatre tickets. These were in great demand, and to secure a 
ticket, one needed connections. A black market, known as the theatre mafia, developed, 
mainly through students attempting to make some money. Fridman saw the opportunity 
and turned the occasional black-market transaction into a regular business. He also 
launched a small cooperative that offered window washing services to various state 
companies. In addition, he operated courier delivery coops, and in 1988 created his own 
photo cooperative, Alfa-Foto. With the accumulated capital, he and his friend, German 
Khan, set up in 1989 a commodity trading company, the Alfa-Eko, which had evolved 
by 1991 into the Alfa-Bank. At this point, Fridman began to nurture his political 
contacts, and recruited Peter Aven, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, to head the 
bank after leaving his cabinet post. Alfa-Bank became one of the biggest banks in 
Russia (Fridman was a member of the big seven club as early as 1996). This success 
enabled Fridman to enter the oil business in a big way: after acquiring Tyumen Oil, he 
sold it to BP, becoming the major shareholder and chairman of the new giant: TNK-BP. 
In all the above cases, political connections with the post-communist elites were used in 
one way or another. However, none of the above oligarchs made their fortune while 
holding political office nor had they been the offspring of high cadres.  
One of the most prominent political capitalists is Vladimir Potanin. He was born in 
1961 into a family where the father was a high official with the ministry of foreign 
trade. Potanin attended the prestigious Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations where 
high cadres for the diplomatic services, foreign trade (and it is assumed even for the 
KGB) were trained. He worked in the ministry of foreign trade and although he started 
private business as early as 1990, he maintained high profile in politics and public 
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administration, serving in 1996-97 as acting First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian 
Federation. Potanin is also known as the brain behind the loans-for-shares programme, 
the scheme used by many of the nouveau riche to accumulate wealth. The scheme called 
for state companies to be offered for sale through auctions, but only selected people 
were invited to bid. Potanin was among the few invited to the auctions by Tatyana 
Yeltsin-Dyachenko, and was thus able to acquire some twenty formerly state-owned 
companies. Potanin’s main acquisition was Norilsk Nickel, a company located on the 
Arctic Circle with some of the world’s largest reserves of nickel, copper, cobalt, 
platinum, etc. This had been a former concentration camp, which was taken over by the 
management in 1991. In 1995 through the subsidiary of Onexim Bank,43 Potanin 
purchased Norilsk at a loans-for-shares auction for US$170 million (Klebnikov 2000: 
204-5). This was exactly the method Khodorosky used for his purchase of Yukos.  
Vadit Alekperov is the oldest among the Russian rich: born in 1950 in Baku, he was 
engaged in the oil industry all his adult life. With an engineering degree, Alekperov 
gradually rose to managerial positions, and was appointed in 1983 director of oil 
production in Kogalym, in western Siberia (Klebnikov 2000: 190-2), which he turned it 
into one of the most productive oil field in the USSR. Having earned the reputation as 
an oil expert, he was appointed in 1990 as deputy minister of oil and gas industry in the 
USSR. In this position, he advocated vertical integration of various oil firms and 
managed to create one such large firm, LukOil. After leaving the ministry, he took over 
as president of LukOil in 1993. When the company was privatized in 1994 in a voucher 
auction, Alekperov and his top managers bought a quarter of its equity, becoming in 
time its majority shareholders. Alekperov and LukOil moved aggressively and acquired 
major oil concessions in Azerbaijan by joining a consortium of major western oil 
companies (BP, Amaco, Exxon). He has also been involved in building a major pipeline 
from Baku to the Black Sea. LukOil has entered similar deals with Chevron with regard 
to the Tenghiz oil fields. Alekperov was rich and powerful already by mid-1990s.  
Among the 30 case studies, the account of Alekperov is the closest example of political 
capitalism in the classical weberian sense of the term, although it needs to be 
emphasized that this way of accumulating capital is rare even in Russia. 
The avenues in Central Europe and Russia for joining the ranks of the new grand 
bourgeoisie were strikingly different. In Hungary the golden road to the grand 
bourgeoisie was open for individuals who had been incumbents of middle- or high-level 
technocratic/managerial positions already under communism. Generally, these men 
were not very young; most had been born in the 1950s, a good decade before the fall of 
communism, the time when the Russian oligarchs launched their careers. A few of the 
wealthiest Hungarians had been engaged in the second or informal economy during 
socialism or had had foreign experience in the pre-transition time. None of Hungary’s 
top-ten had been in a high political position before 1989. While most took advantage of 
links to the new political elites in promoting their businesses, it was the political elite 
who, by the end of the first decade of the millennium, were approaching new grand 
bourgeoisie for campaign contributions and advice. In Russia we find little evidence for 
the classical political capitalism thesis. Only Potanin and Alekperov seem to have used 
their political office to promote their business interests. Suleyman Kerimov, often 
                                                 
43 The subsidiary had established by Potanin during the early 1990s on the ruins of the Soviet Union’s 
primary foreign trade bank. 23 
identified as Russia’s richest civil servant (and indeed, as a member of the Federation 
Office of Russia, he is high ranking), may fit the category, but the information on him is 
somewhat contradictory. But the oligarchs, although composed of people without 
political office or family histories of high political cadres, were closely linked to post-
communist political elites. They usually formed a tightly organized network and built 
their futures on favours from the political elites. Once the political master changed 
(Putin replacing Yeltsin), they needed to convince Putin that their loyalty to him was 
unconditional. Abramovich, Deripaska and Potanin succeeded to transfer their loyalty, 
but Berezovsky, Khodorovsky and Gusinsky fell out of favour, losing most of their 
property. Many Russian oligarchs had started out in the informal economy, and became 
ultra-rich by nurturing their contacts with the post-communist elite (most of whom were 
from the old communist guard). Fridman is the exception here. No-one among the top-
ten managed to leap-frog from being a small businessman to the ranks of the new grand 
bourgeoisie without the benefit of intimate political connections. 
While it has been consistently argued in this paper that the available data offer little 
support for the classical political capitalism thesis even in the case of Russia, it is 
important to note that this may be just a measurement error. It is difficult to estimate 
how much private wealth officeholders had accumulated while in office, as they were 
likely to hide their fortunes. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was involved in the 
privatization of the oil industry and the CIA estimated as early as 1996 that his assets 
were worth US$5 billion (Klebnikov 2000: 235). This could have easily made him the 
richest, or at least one of the richest, men in Russia at that time. But Chernomyrdin is 
not identified on the Forbes billionaire list. Was the CIA wrong or was he hiding his 
assets? Typically, the incumbents of high political offices were accused of relatively 
minor corruption violations. For instance, Chubais accepted a US$90,000 advance on a 
book contract while in office and this was enough to push him from the job (ibid.: 115). 
According to Klebnikov, Yeltsin was known to be rather worried about corruption, but 
he himself received approximately US$16,000 a month from an honoraria account for 
his book Notes of a President. No data are available on the private wealth of Tatyana 
Yeltsin-Dyachenko-Yumachev, but neither she nor her husbands feature on the Forbes 
lists. She could be hiding assets, or she might not have received billions in kick-back. 
The nature and extent of the ‘gifts’ or ‘bribes’ high Russian officeholders are known to 
have received are no different from what we know in western democracies.  
But again it needs to be emphasized: we do not really know. After considerable 
contemplation, I decided that the purpose of this paper is not to give accurate 
estimations of wealth, nor to try to explore the extra-legal ways the upper class 
assembled its riches. Rather, the purpose is to report what is publicly known and to try 
to understand how the enormous amounts of wealth were accumulated within the 
existing legal framework. This paper is not concerned with corruption, but rather about 
the rules of the game. It has tried to provide insights into the enrichment path of the 
super-rich in a manner that they themselves would accept as accurate. 
3.3  The billionaires of China 
The data from China suggest the formation of the new propertied grand bourgeoisie in 
this country followed a different trajectory. As far as can be determined, eight of the 
top-ten started from small businesses; business ventures that expanded and made the 
owners dollar-billionaires. There are two exceptions: Zhengrong Shi became a 24 
billionaire through the skills and income he earned while living in Australia; Zhjinan 
Rong is the son of high-ranking official. However, even here, it is more the case of 
exchanging economic capital into political capital, and its reconversion to economic 
capital, rather than the classical case of political capitalism. 
The Chinese data may not be as reliable as one would wish, and a study of the formation 
of the country’s domestic grand bourgeoisie requires greater care than in the other two 
regions. China is a communist country, at least politically, and while private ownership 
is legal, it is viewed with suspicion.  
Table 3 






2009  Main business  Source of wealth 
1 Huang, Guangyu  6.3 billion  39  Household appliances, 
real estate 
Small private business 
growing large 
2 Du, Shuanghua  5.1 billion  44  Steel  ditto 
3 Yang, Huiyan  4.9 billion  28  Real estate  Family business 
4 Peng, Xiaofeng  4.0 billion  34  Solar panels  Small private business 
growing large 
5 Liu, Yangxing & family 3.7 billion  58  Animal feed, aluminium, 
finance 
ditto 
6 .Rong, Zhjijan  3.7 billion  67  Electronics, diversified  Political capital, family 
business 
7 Shi, Zhengrong  3.2 billion  46  Solar power  Foreign experience 
8 Zhang, Jindong  3.2 billion  46  Household appliances, 
real estate 
Small private business 
growing large 
9 Xu, Rongmao  3.1 billion  59  Real estate, hotels  ditto 
10 Zhang, Zhixiang  2.9 billion  42  Steel  ditto 
Source: Hurun Report (2008). 
As mentioned earlier, the party secretary of Rizhao Steel had good reason to be 
concerned when Du, their CEO, was ranked among the super-rich in 2008 by Hurun. 
Many who had been identified as the very rich had caught the attention of the taxation 
office and other state agencies, triggering careful scrutiny into their wealth to determine 
its source, with the possible, ultimate result of ending up in court or jail. Thus, while 
most of mega-rich in Hungary want to show off, their counterparts in China may prefer 
to remain anonymous. This may be true particularly for the princelings, who are the 
children of high cadres, often the managers of formally publicly owned firms, which de 
facto may be their private property. Even with these reservations, one cannot fail to 
notice that eight of the ten wealthiest started from small family businesses, which 
eventually grew into large capitalist corporations.  
It is also interesting to note that no woman has been identified among the top-ten either 
in Russia or in Hungary (and all the billionaires from Poland, Romania, the Czech 
Republic are males), but there are two women in China; Huiyan Yang and Yin Zhang 
(Zhang was not listed among the top-ten in 2008 but was, for instance, named by Hurun 
in 2006 as the wealthiest individual in China). 25 
The upper class in China is characterized by a unique feature. As one would expect, 
much of the wealth is defined as ‘family fortune’. While wealthy Hungarians appear to 
be keen to build ‘dynasties’,44 and the Russian oligarchs are too young to think along 
these lines, dynasties are already in existence in China. What is intriguing is that in 
many cases, the fortunes are referred to as belonging to the family, hence Hurun lists 
them as Liu and family; Xu and family; Zhu and family. This is no surprise for those 
familiar with the Chinese business culture: kinship is a major feature of 
entrepreneurship, not only is wealth passed on to the children, but brothers and sisters, 
or even cousins, are involved in business ventures.  
Let us start with Huiyan Yang, the owner of Country Garden. She is a real estate mogul, 
whose wealth is assessed at approximately US$5 billion, and is a typical example of 
wealth accumulation that started from a small business and expanded. Her story also 
highlights the importance of family ties in the process of achieving the upper levels of 
society. Huiyan Yang is the daughter of Guoqiang Yang (Yeung Kwok Keung in the 
Hong Kong translation). Born in Guangdong Province in 1954, Yang grew up very poor 
in the city of Foshan (Barbazona 2007). He laboured as a rice farmer as well as 
construction worker and married a bricklayer who was on the same construction crew, a 
typical story under Chairman Mao and the early years of reform. But as the reform 
continued into the early 1990s Yang started a small real estate business, acquiring 
distressed property, even wastelands when the market was stagnant. By the end of the 
decade, the government allowed companies to acquire public land and sell plots to home 
buyers, and Yang moved fast in 1997 to establish his company, Country Garden (known 
as Biguiyuan in Chinese). Eventually Country Garden became one of the largest real 
estate development firms in China, specializing mainly in affordable housing. 
Yang made careful plans to pass his business over to his children. He brought his 
second daughter, the heir-select Huiyan, to board meetings when she was still a 
middle-school student and he sent her to an American university to prepare her for the 
CEO job. In 2007 he handed over 70 per cent of the Country Garden shares to Huiyan, 
instantly making her the richest young woman in the world, ranking ahead of another 
wealthy lady, Yin Zhang, the newspaper queen of China. But the road of the petty 
bourgeois to wealth does not mean, at least not in China, the lack of appreciation of 
political capital. In 2007, Huiyan married the 24-year old son of a senior official of a 
northeastern province and, according to China Daily, this ‘pleased Yang’s father’.45 
The story of Guangyu Huang (born in 1969; he is also known as Wong Kwong Yu) is 
not very different from Guoqiang Yang, except for the fact that being much younger 
Huang was simply on a faster track. He started out as a street vendor selling radios and 
watches. Eventually he turned his street stall into China’s largest consumer electronic 
retailer, GOMNE. It might have been his bad luck that Hurun ranked him in 2008 as the 
wealthiest Chinese: soon after, he was accused of stock market manipulation, resigned 
his GOMNE chairmanship and disappeared. There is no mention of him in the 2009 
Forbes list of billionaires. The Chinese police have confirmed that he is under 
investigation and several top officials in provincial government have been arrested in 
connection with Huang’s corruption charges.  
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Shuanghua Du did not start as a small entrepreneur in the manner of Yang or Huang, 
but in 1987 he did set up a rather small steel firm (with an investment estimated at less 
than US$300,000). The business grew exponentially, particularly after its relocation to 
Rizhao City. It is the largest steel enterprise in Shandong province and, of late, in China, 
but it is hard to determine the division of ownership between private and public. This 
makes estimating Du’s private wealth difficult. He has played his cards carefully. As 
China Business Focus reported in 2009, Du believes that a combination of public and 
private ownership is ideal. Du is appreciative of his party secretary:  
Du asked the staff to study the speech of Chairman Mao in the Second 
Session of the Seventeen Congress … He also asked the staff to study 
and understand the spirit of the ‘two essentials’ (the spirit was proposed 
by Chairman Mao in the Second Session and the Seventh Conference). 
This is certainly unusual for a member of the new grand bourgeoisie, but it is the 
Chinese way. Nevertheless, the secretary of Du’s communist party cell was right to be 
concerned. It was reported in July 2009 that the state-owned Shangdong Steel Group, a 
major rival of Rizhao Steel, was being reorganized, most likely with the objective of 
extending governmental control to Rinshao.46  
Jindong Zhang also started small and grew into a major businessman without the benefit 
of political connections (as far as it is possible to determine). Born in 1963 in Anhui 
province, Zhang worked for a couple of years as a manual worker in a clothing factory. 
He opened a small shop in 1990 with his brother Guiping Zhang, selling air conditioners 
and other appliances in Nanjing, which in time expanded into Suning, a large appliance 
trading company (his brother left the business to him and is now in real estate). 
Among China’s top-ten richest men are two for whom experience abroad was an 
important factor in their success. Zhengrong Shi (born in 1963), a farmer’s son, grew up 
in extreme poverty. In the aftermath of the great famine his family was so poor that his 
parents had to give him up for adoption. But he did well in school. Shi moved to Sydney 
in 1988 on an exchange scholarship to the University of New South Wales, and 
completed his MA.47 During his stay in Australia, he became knowledgeable about 
solar technology and after moving back to China in 2001, he persuaded the city of Wuxi 
to set up a solar-cell company. In 2005, the firm was bought up by a US company and 
his own private firm, Suntech Power, became the first Chinese company to be listed on 
the New York Stock exchange.  
Rongmao Xu is another returning migrant, who has made it to the billionaire club. Xu 
was born in 1950, a difficult period, as he was plagued by the problems of the Cultural 
Revolution. After graduating from high school, he was sent to the countryside as a 
‘barefoot doctor’, and as soon as he was able, he migrated to Hong Kong, where he 
worked in a textile company. This was in the 1970s. Able to save some money in Hong 
Kong, he returned to China 1988, with the intention of setting up a small knitting 
factory. But he quickly realized that private hotels offered a better business option. He 
launched his career by building the first private three-star hotel in China, even though it 
was still illegal at that time. But apparently Xu’s timing was just right. Real estate prices 
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started to boom, and he branched out into the property markets in Beijing and Shanghai, 
making a fortune. He gradually acquired public companies that were listed either on the 
Shanghai or Hong Kong stock market and his empire now consists of several privately-
owned firms: Shimao Holding, Shimao International and Shimao Property.  
There is very little evidence of the role played by political capital in the formation of the 
Chinese grand bourgeoisie. The case of Zhijan Rong (or Larry Yung Chi Kin) perhaps 
best exemplifies the case where parents’ political status and possible political 
connections through a highly placed cadre father might have had an impact on his 
enrichment. Zhijan Rong’s father was Yiren Rong who during the 1990s was vice 
president of China. Zhijan Rong48 was born in Shanghai and attended Tianjin 
University where he graduated in 1964, majoring in electrical engineering. In 1966 he 
was sent to the countryside, but was able to return to Beijing already in 1972. In 1978 
he obtained a one-way exit visa to Hong Kong. His father was not a high-ranking 
official at that time, but had good connections to Deng Xiaoping. It is possible that this 
contact might have helped Rong senior with his son’s visa, albeit on the condition that 
he had to leave his whole family, including his wife and children, behind. In Hong Kong 
he had access to some of the capital his family secured there before communism. As the 
reforms were unfolding, Rong began to cooperate with mainland China to set up various 
businesses with the Chinese government as a majority shareholder. He concentrated on 
electronics and computing, and is currently the president of the Hong Kong-based 
CITIC Pacific Limited, a conglomerate with a highly diversified portfolio that ranges 
from steel production, aviation, construction, manufacturing, auto industry, etc. In 2008, 
Rong was ranked as the 6th wealthiest on mainland China.  
Zhijan Rong’s success story could be construed as political capitalism: Zhijan Rong was 
allowed to move to Hong Kong because of political connections and he formulated his 
private ventures in collaboration with the Chinese state-run businesses there. And his 
father, Yiren Rong, was, indeed, a close associate of Deng Xiaoping, advancing over 
time to become the vice president of China. Still, this is very rare, and exemplifies a 
very different utilization of political capital than what was apparent in Russia or even in 
Hungary.  
Yiren Rong49 was born in 1916 to an affluent Chinese family. His father Desheng Rong 
and uncle Zongjing Rong were the pioneers of modern industry in China: by 1940 they 
owned dozens of textile, manufacturing, printing companies and flour mills all over the 
country. With the tightening of Maoist rule, Yiren Rong, given his background, faced 
hard times, but he was acquainted with Deng Xiaoping. After Deng Xiaoping emerged 
as the leader of China, he sought Yiren Rong’s help in efforts to bridge China with the 
world. Rong was asked to set up the China Investment Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC) that was doing business for China through Hong Kong. In 
recognition of his contribution to the modernization and opening up of China, Rong was 
honoured with the position of vice president. When he passed away in 2005, he was 
praised as ‘an outstanding representative of the national industrial and commercial 
circle in modern China’ and as a ‘superb state leader … a great fighter for patriotism 
and communism’. This seems to represent the case of economic capital being 
                                                 
48  See www.chinaentrepreuer.blogspot.com/2008/06/rong-zhijan-citic-pacific-group-part-1.html. 
49  See www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/27/content_488274.htm. 28 
successfully converted into political one, rather than the other way around. This is 
uniquely a Chinese approach that would have been unimaginable in Russia or Central 
Europe. It was attempted in Russia by the oligarchs and the new grand bourgeoisie in 
Central Europe are also increasing their claims for political influence, or even direct 
political power. 
4 Concluding  remarks 
There are three channels for achieving the ranks of the new grand bourgeoisie and these 
are typical of the three different post-communism societies. In Central Europe, the 
golden road to higher society was the opportunities offered by being in a technocratic-
managerial position, and using one’s managerial skills and connections to acquire 
publicly-owned property in competitive auctions. None of the super-rich had held high-
ranking governmental or political positions under communism and even though most 
had had political connections, this was not the main factor promoting their wealth: 
contacts merely facilitated their enrichment. The political sphere currently is more 
reliant on the super-rich than these are on political bosses. In Russia, the way to the 
upper-upper class was via personal contacts in the highest political circles, particularly 
with Yeltsin family. Enrichment depended on voucher privatization. Even though there 
were privatization auctions, these typically were not open to all and did not really 
constitute fair bids. Auctions were by invitation only and those participated who had 
been invited by the political bosses. This induced rather insecure property rights 
because a change in political leadership would introduce suspicions of lack of loyalty. 
In China, the new upper-upper class often evolved from small businesses and humble 
backgrounds. These small businesses gradually prospered, but contrary to Russia or 
Central Europe, the source of new wealth in China was not the privatization of SOEs. 
But given the neopatrimonial nature of the Chinese party-state, entrepreneurs had to 
seek patronage in the party-state in order to keep their businesses running and safe from 
political prosecution.  
The link between political power and economic wealth was important in all three post-
communism societies. In this respect the main difference between the three societies is 
not in the strength of business-politics, but in the nature of this relationship, in other 
words: it is in the security of private property rights. Private property rights in Central 
Europe are secure. This is a fact: there is not a single case of private property being 
diverted by political authorities from the new private owners to the new entourage of 
political bosses. On the other hand, private property rights in Russia and China are 
rather insecure, but in different ways. In Russia, private property was given to the 
oligarchs by the grace of the political authorities. Given this genesis, a change of 
political leadership could re-assign the assets to new cronies in exchange for their 
unconditional loyalty and service. In China, given the importance of socialist principles 
for the legitimacy of the political regime and the increasing control of the central state 
over the economic process, private property accumulated through entrepreneurship is 
typically viewed with suspicion. The new rich need the protection of political 
authorities in order to survive and to prosper, but finding protectors can be perceived as 
‘corruption’ by other fractions of the party-state elite. Hence, accusations of corruption 
and tax evasion can subject private property to re-appropriation by political authorities. 29 
In sum, while the upper-upper class in Central Europe can be considered as only 
modestly wealthy, its position is fairly secure. The mega rich in Russia and the 
reasonably rich in China are highly insecure; there is little reproduction and great deal 
of circulation in the Russian and Chinese upper-upper class, though this circulation is 
driven by different mechanisms. 
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